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anti-corruption reforms
Kjetil Bjorvatn, Gaute Torsvik, Bertil Tungodden∗
December 6, 2004
Abstract
The anti-corruption reform in the Tanzanian tax bureaucracy in
the mid-1990s was apparently a short-lived success. In the wake of
the reform, a number of “tax experts” established themselves in the
market, many of them being laid oﬀ tax bureaucrats. We argue that
middle-men can undermine the eﬀect of an anti-corruption reform by
reducing the uncertainty that firms face vis-à-vis a reformed tax bu-
reaucracy, which in turn may encourage firms to pay bribes rather
than taxes. Indeed, under some circumstances, middle-men can cause
corruption to be higher after the reform than before the reform. Since
the demand for middle-men may increase with the extent of the re-
form, we also demonstrate that a small reform may be more eﬃcient
in combatting corruption than a more radical reform.
JEL: H26, K42, O12
Keywords: Corruption, reform, middle-men, institutions
1 Introduction
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon in the tax administrations of de-
veloping countries. A number of African countries have implemented bu-
reaucratic reforms in order to reduce corruption and increase tax revenues.
Tanzania introduced a major reform in 1996 with the formation of Tanzania
Revenue Authority (TRA).1 In this reform, among other measures, 35% of
∗We would like to thank Odd Fjeldstad, Ivar Kolstad, and Tina Søreide for valuable
comments to the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
1See Fjeldstad (2003) for further discussion of the reform in TRA.
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the staﬀ was fired. Initially, the reform appeared to be successful. Reports
indicated that corruption was declining. However, it has been argued that
the success did not last for long, and that the positive process experienced
in the initial phase after the introduction of TRA has later been reversed.
One possible explanation for the short-lived success of the reform is that it
was not suﬃciently radical. There may be strong forces pulling the economy
towards a highly corrupt equilibrium, and a “big push” reformmay be needed
to bring the economy on the path towards an equilibrium characterized by
less corruption (see Andvig and Moene, 1990).
While this is a perfectly plausible argument, we suggest a diﬀerent expla-
nation. Our explanation is inspired by Fjeldstad’s (2003) study of the TRA
reform. He observes that following the reform, there was a sharp increase
in the number of “tax experts” in Tanzania, many of them being laid oﬀ
tax oﬃcers from TRA. Fjeldstad suggests that these experts entered into
corruption networks with external actors. In accordance with this observa-
tion, the present study focuses on the role of middle-men as obstacles to
anti-corruption reform. We argue that the anti-corruption reform may have
failed not because it was too limited, as the “big-push” story suggests, but
because it was too radical given the institutional quality of the bureaucratic
structures, thus creating a market for middle-men which allowed corruption
to continue in a new form.
The mechanism we propose is the following. Bureaucratic reform creates
uncertainty in the business community about the degree of honesty in the
bureaucracy. This uncertainty may induce some firms to pay taxes. However,
the uncertainty also creates demand for middle-men with inside information
about the reformed tax authority and an ability to influence the process
of tax collection. A moderate reform creates limited demand for middle-
man services, and hence potential middle-men may find it more profitable
to seek alternative employment. A radical reform, on the other hand, may
lead to the establishment of middle-men who undermine the reform process
by connecting the business community with corrupt tax oﬃcers remaining
in the reformed bureaucracy. The extent to which middle-men will find it
profitable to operate in this way depends on the overall institutional quality
of the bureaucracy, the level of punishment, and their alternative income
opportunities.
How important is the role of middle-men in corruption? It is naturally
diﬃcult to establish empirical evidence in cases of corruption. In fact, as
Susan Rose-Ackerman (2001) points out, it is precisely the unlawfulness of
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these activities that creates demand for middle-men: “Because bribers and
bribees are operating outside the law, they need to trust each other in or-
der to maintain the relationships. They may design schemes that minimize
the possibility of betrayal, such as making payment only when corrupt ser-
vices are delivered, or that limit the costs of betrayal, such as the use of
middlemen.”
An indication of the importance of middle-men in facilitating corrupt
deals with the Tanzanian tax administration can be found in The Guardian
(Tanzania) on June 7, 2004. The main story that day reports on a consign-
ment of electronic goods arriving at the Dar es Salaam port in the autumn
of 2003. The container with the goods disappeared from the port without
any import duty being paid. Apparently, a corrupt deal lay behind this inci-
dence, involving the importer of the goods, TRA staﬀ, a middle-man, and a
clearing and forwarding firm. The importer contacted a middle-man to find
ways of getting the goods out of the port without paying the required duty.
A meeting was subsequently arranged at the Hill Tech Bar in Ukonga, Dar
es Salaam, between oﬃcials from TRA and the clearing agents to “hatch a
plot to sneak the container out of the port”, as the story goes. The TRA
employee and the clearing agent are reported to have been bribed 7 million
Tsh and 2 million Tsh, respectively. The TRA in this way lost 20 million
Tsh in customs duty on the shipment. The middle-man “played a leading
role in the scandal before apparently disappearing into thin air.” Evidently,
this corrupt deal was not a single incidence. Rather, it “may be a pointer to
other shady deals whereby containers are sneaked out of the Dar es Salaam
port without customs duty being paid.”
The main focus of our analysis is on the eﬀect of a human resource reform,
upgrading the degree of honesty amongst the tax bureaucrats. In most cases,
however, an anti-corruption reform consists of a number of measures. By way
of illustration, in Tanzania, after firing a large portion of the staﬀ in 1996,
they also developed an Anti-corruption and Integrity Development Strategy,
with the aim of improving the systems of internal control, capacity building
and monitoring. Yet another measure was the introduction of The Preven-
tion of Corruption Bureau in order to improve the system of punishment of
corrupt individuals.
We capture this multi-dimensional nature of an anti-corruption reform by
considering three diﬀerent measures available to the government. First, they
may attempt to break up established networks by rotating the staﬀ in the tax
administration and to increase the degree of honesty of the administration by
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firing corrupt oﬃcers and raising the ethical standards of the staﬀ. We shall
refer to these measures as a “human resource reform”. Second, we consider
a “legal reform” with increased punishment for corruption. Third, the gov-
ernment may attempt to improve control systems that make it more diﬃcult
for corrupt tax oﬃcers and middle-men to maneuver in the tax bureaucracy.
We refer to such measures as an “institutional reform”.
The ambition of our paper is to demonstrate that an anti-corruption
reform may create a market for middle-men, which in turn may undermine
the reform by creating a new channel for corruption. In fact, we show that
in some cases the establishment of a market for middle-men may cause the
reform to have the perverse eﬀect of increasing the level of corruption in the
economy, relative to the pre-reform level. We structure the analysis in the
following way. Section 2 presents the model, describing first the pre-reform
situation (Section 2.1), then the reform without middle-men (Section 2.2),
and finally reform with middle-men (Section 2.3). Section 3 then moves on
to describing how the anti-corruption reform aﬀects the incentive for middle-
men to enter the market. Section 4 demonstrates how middle-men may
undermine reform. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a bureaucracy in charge of collecting a uniform tax t from the firms
in the economy. Some of the tax oﬃcers are corrupt. Firms dealing with a
corrupt oﬃcer may pay a bribe, bi, instead of the tax. Firms that are well
connected with the political leadership or have low mobility costs can get
away with paying a small bribe. Firms that are less influential or have high
sunk costs may have to pay a higher bribe.2
The size of the bribe also depends on the quality of institutions, which we
measure by q. The institutional quality may be seen as capturing the level of
corruption among the top leaders in the tax administration and the overall
quality in the administrative structures in the bureaucracy. More specifically,
more or less developed control systems may be in place to supervise the
tax collection process. The more developed are the control systems, the
more side-payments a corrupt tax oﬃcer needs in order to make a corrupt
transaction go through without being disclosed. Therefore, the higher is q,
2The assumption that firms pay bribes according to their bargaining power finds em-
pirical support in Svensson (2003).
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the higher is the bribe that he will demand from a firm.3 For simplicity, we
assume that once the required bribe has been paid, the corrupt oﬃcer can
complete the corrupt deal without exposing the firm to any risk of disclosure.
To capture in a simple way the assumptions that a bribe depends neg-
atively on the firm’s bargaining power, and positively on the quality of in-
stitutions and the tax rate, let the bribe demanded by a corrupt tax oﬃcer
from firm i be given by,
bi =
cit
1− q , (1)
where ci is an inverse measure of bargaining power, assumed to be uni-
formly distributed across firms within an industry with the support [0, 1].4
The firm with the lowest bargaining power, i.e., characterized by ci = 1, must
pay a bribe equal to t/ (1− q). Clearly, for the least influential firm, q > 0
implies bi > t. Hence, this firm has nothing to gain from oﬀering a bribe
to its corrupt tax oﬃcer. At the other extreme, the most influential firm is
characterized by ci = 0, and for this firm, bi = 0 for any q < 1. Due to its
close connections with the political leadership or high degree of mobility, in
any less than perfect institutional environment the most influential firm can
get away without paying any bribe at all. For q = 1, we assume that no firm
can aﬀord to pay the bribe that the corrupt tax oﬃcer demands.
The government observes that corruption is a problem in the tax admin-
istration, and wishes to do something about it. It is, however, very diﬃcult
to establish exact knowledge about this problem. In particular, it is diﬃcult
to obtain evidence on corrupt transactions. Assume that the government can
separate tax oﬃcers who are not involved in corruption from those who may
be involved in corrupt transactions. The anti-corruption reform that the
government considers to implement aﬀects only this second group of tax of-
ficers, their number being given by n. The key feature of the campaign is a
human resource reform, where some of these n tax oﬃcers are singled out,
fired and replaced, while the rest are subject to internal rotation.5 In this
3One could argue that the bargaining strength of the tax collector also depends on the
total number of corrupt tax collectors. It is straightforward to incorporate this feature in
the model, but it will not aﬀect the qualitative results.
4We can think of the firms characterized by ci ≤ 1 as a subset of all firms in the economy.
These are the potentially corrupt firms. In addition, there may be firms characterized by
ci > 1, firms which, for moral reasons for instance, would never choose to pay a bribe.
These firms play no role in the present analysis.
5For an experimental study of the eﬀects of staﬀ rotation in anti-corruption policies,
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way, the government attempts to break up relationships established between
firms and tax oﬃcers in the pre-reform regime.
2.1 The pre-reform situation
Prior to the anti-corruption campaign, firms have a long-standing relation-
ship with their respective tax oﬃcers in the tax administration. We simplify
by assuming that all firms know with certainty what kind of tax oﬃcer they
are dealing with, i.e., whether he is corrupt or not. In the absence of middle-
men, each tax oﬃcial is assigned the responsibility for a group of firms, which
we will refer to as an “industry”. For simplicity, the industries are assumed
to be identical.
Suppose that among the n tax oﬃcers that are aﬀected by the reform,
there are l0 < n tax oﬃcers that do not take bribes and n − l0 that are
corrupt. Recall, however, that the government does not have perfect infor-
mation about which of the n oﬃcers are corrupt, and which are honest. In
an industry dealing with one of the n− l0 corrupt tax oﬃcers, the marginal
bribe payer can be found from the condition bi = t and (1) as,
ci = 1− q ≡ c0. (2)
Since there are n− l0 corrupt oﬃcers in the pre-reform regime, the total
number of bribe paying firms is given by (n− l0) c0. A share 1 − c0 = q of
the firms in an industry dealing with a corrupt tax oﬃcer pay taxes prior to
the reform, since the bribe demanded by the corrupt tax oﬃcer exceeds the
tax. From (2) we can conclude that,
Lemma 1 Prior to the reform, a share c0 of the firms in an industry dealing
with a corrupt tax oﬃcer pay bribes. The total number of bribes is given by
(n− l0) c0.
Clearly, the better is the institutional quality, the more firms pay taxes
prior to the reform. As q approaches unity, the bribe a firm needs to pay
approaches infinity, and the number of bribe paying firms goes to zero. For
q = 0, all firms with ci < 1 have something to gain from a bribe.
see Abbink (2004).
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2.2 Reform and corruption without middle-men
A human resource reform in the tax administration aims at breaking up
existing networks between bureaucrats and firms. In our model, firms be-
longing to the n industries aﬀected by the reform have to deal with a new
tax oﬃcer, and they do not know whether this tax oﬃcer is corrupt or not.
This uncertainty may reduce the number of firms that choose to pay bribes.6
Reforms in the tax administration are usually reported extensively in the
media and discussed and analyzed in the business community, and hence
we can reasonably assume that firms are well informed about the aggregate
performance of the reform. With respect to a human resource reform, this
amounts to having a reasonable estimate of l, which denotes the number of
honest tax oﬃcers in the group of n tax oﬃcers in the post-reform regime.
We will restrict our attention to a “successful” reform, in the sense that the
human resource reform increases the number of honest tax bureaucrats, i.e.,
l > l0. Moreover, we limit our analysis to l < n, meaning that not all corrupt
tax oﬃcers can be removed by the reform.
The human resource reform takes place in an environment of a given set
of legal and institutional standards, and the eﬀect of the human resource
reform depends on these standards. Moreover, the government may seek to
change the institutional and legal environment. We shall consider both a
“legal reform” involving increased punishment p for firms that are caught of-
fering bribes, and an “institutional reform” aimed at improving institutional
quality, q. Unless otherwise stated, we limit our attention to q < 1 and p > 0,
meaning that the institutional quality is less than perfect, and that there is
a positive punishment for corruption.
An improvement in the institutional quality of the tax administration
makes it more diﬃcult for corrupt tax oﬃcers to operate. From (1) we see
that an increase in q increases the bribe a firm needs to pay in order to avoid
the tax. The higher is q, the lower is c0, and hence the fewer are the firms
that are willing to pay this bribe and the more firms choose to pay the tax.
In addition, as will be clear later, improving the institutional quality also
aﬀects the ability of middle-men to operate, thereby reducing the extent of
corruption via such intermediaries.
We make the assumption that the chance of making a bribe oﬀer to an
honest tax collector after the reform is proportional to the share of honest
6We can think of the reform as institutionalizing the process of rotation, and therefore
introducing uncertainty on a permanent basis for the business community.
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tax oﬃcers in the reformed bureaucracy, i.e., l/n. Let π¯ represent profits
prior to taxes or bribes. For simplicity, we assume that π¯ is the same for all
firms. The expected profit of a firm suggesting a corrupt transaction in the
reformed bureaucracy is given by,
πbi = π¯ −
µ
n− l
n
¶
bi −
l
n
(t+ p) . (3)
The second term on the right hand side gives the likelihood that the
firm is matched with a corrupt bureaucrat times the bribe it has to pay.
The third term gives the likelihood that the firm is connected to an honest
bureaucrat, in which case it has to pay the tax plus a punishment. Note that
this punishment is not necessarily the result of a verdict in a court of law.
Indeed, it may be diﬃcult to convict firms for making corrupt oﬀers. Still,
oﬀering a bribe to an honest bureaucrat is likely to be costly to a firm. The
bureaucrat may decide to investigate the firm’s past tax record and to closely
monitor its current operations. In this process, irregularities could well be
disclosed that would not have come to the attention of the authorities had
the firm paid the tax in the first place. In the following, however, we will have
in mind a legal punishment when we discuss the implications of increasing p
as part of an anti-corruption reform.
If a firm decides to pay the oﬃcial tax, its profits are given by,
πt = π¯ − t. (4)
Using (3) and (4), the condition πbi = πt gives us the share of firms that
choose to continue to oﬀer bribes, despite the uncertainty imposed on them
by the reform,
ci = max
½·
1−
µ
l
n− l
¶
p
t
¸
(1− q) , 0
¾
≡ c∗. (5)
From (2) and (5) we see that,
Lemma 2 After a human resource reform, in the absence of middle-men,
a share c∗ < c0 of the firms in each of the n industries aﬀected by the re-
form oﬀer bribes. The total number of successful bribe attempts is given by
(n− l) c∗ < (n− l0) c0.
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Note that the firms with the strongest bargaining power, i.e., with the
lowest ci, are the ones that continue to oﬀer bribes after the reform. Intu-
itively, these are the firms that have the most to gain from paying a bribe
rather than the honest tax. Consequently, a share c∗ choose to oﬀer bribes
and a share (1− c∗) choose to pay the tax.
From (5) we also see that,
Lemma 3 For c∗ > 0, ∂c
∗
∂l = −
pn(1−q)
t(n−l)2 < 0,
∂c∗
∂p = −
l(1−q)
t(n−l) < 0, and
∂c∗
∂q =
−
¡
1− l
n−l
p
t
¢
< 0.
The policy implication from Lemma 3 is that the government should carry
out as radical a reform as possible. This means replacing as many corrupt
tax oﬃcers as possible, and increasing the level of punishment and improv-
ing the institutional quality as much as possible. Ideally, this should imply
a reformed bureaucracy consisting of only honest tax oﬃcers (l = n), elimi-
nating the ability of firms to avoid taxation. Alternatively, the government
could impose an infinitely high punishment, say, death penalty, for oﬀering
bribes.7 In this case, even the smallest human resource reform would elim-
inate all corruption. There may, however, be problems with both of these
recommendations. Regarding punishment, it may be politically unfeasible
to raise the punishment above a level that people regard as “fair”. As for
firing and hiring tax oﬃcers reform, it is probably impossible to identify all
corrupt bureaucrats and replace these with equally competent, but honest,
people.
As a result of these limitations to reform, dishonest bureaucrats are likely
to remain in the reformed bureaucracy. Similarly, the level of punishment will
not be suﬃciently high to eliminate all corruption. Networks may then be
established between these corrupt tax oﬃcers and firms, by the assistance of
middle-men. We now turn to an analysis of how the presence of middle-men
aﬀect the reform.
2.3 Reform and corruption with middle-men
The fired tax oﬃcers, or other individuals with inside information and con-
nections in the reformed bureaucracy, face the choice of entering into some
7Tanzi (1998: 574) reports that for instance China has applied the death penalty to
some individuals accused of corruption.
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productive activity or establishing themselves as “tax experts”, who we shall
generally refer to as middle-men. We will for now assume that a middle-man
has indeed entered the market. The present section derives the share of firms
that will make use of his services. We later deal with the issue of whether a
middle-man will in fact choose to enter or not.
The middle-men have inside information about the people in the bu-
reaucracy, and can assist firms wishing to make a corrupt transaction. For
simplicity, we assume that each middle-man can service only one industry.
Middle-men are able to influence procedures, such that a firm wishing to
pay a bribe rather than the tax is guided to a corrupt tax oﬃcer. Their
ability to do so, however, depends on the quality of institutions. We assume
that the probability s (q) of a middle-man successfully connecting a firm to
a corrupt tax oﬃcer depends negatively on q. To simplify, we assume that
s (q) = 1 − q, and that q also represents the probability of the middle-man
failing to influence the process. When q = 0, institutional control systems are
entirely absent. The middle-men are then in full control and can completely
eliminate any uncertainty for the firms, whereas q = 1 reflects the situation
where middle-men have no influence in this process.8
A firm’s expected profits if it uses the services of a middle-man, gross of
the payments to the middle-man, is now given by,
πmi = qπbi + (1− q)(π¯ − bi). (6)
The first term represents the probability of the middle-man not influenc-
ing the process, in which case the firm’s profit is identical to the situation
where it bribes alone, given by (3). The second term gives the probabil-
ity of the middle-man connecting the firm with a corrupt oﬃcer, in which
case the firm’s profits is given by the pre-tax profits minus the amount of
bribes. Using (3) in (6) we can express the firm’s expected profits from using
a middle-man as a function of the parameters of reform,
πmi = π¯ −
µ
n− ql
n
¶
bi −
ql
n
(t+ p) . (7)
Like the corrupt tax oﬃcer, we assume that the middle-man is able to
price discriminate between the firms when charging compensation for his
8The institutional quality may also aﬀect the level of corruption among tax oﬃcers, as
discussed in Chand and Moene (1999). In our model, however, the level of corruption in
the bureaucracy is determined uniquely by the degree of the human resource reform.
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services. For simplicity, we assume that the middle-man’s marginal cost in
servicing the firms in an industry is zero. This implies that all firms with
a positive willingness to pay for middle-man services will make use of these
services if oﬀered. Comparing (3) and (7) we see that πmi > πbi for q < 1.
Hence, all firms that oﬀer bribes in the absence of a middle-man have a
positive willingness to pay for such services, and will therefore make use of
them once made available. In addition, the entry of middle-men may induce
some firms to pay bribes rather than taxes. Since these firms are the marginal
users of middle-men, the share of firms that oﬀer a bribe in the presence of
middle-men can be found from the condition πmi = πt, which, from (3) and
(7) results in,
ci = max
½·
1−
µ
lq
n− lq
¶
p
t
¸
(1− q) , 0
¾
≡ c∗∗. (8)
A share c∗∗ of the firms in each industry oﬀer bribes through middle-
men. Of these, a fraction 1 − q reach a corrupt oﬃcer with certainty. The
remaining fraction, q, are in the same situation as if they were bribing on
their own, and thus reach a corrupt oﬃcer with probability n − l. In sum,
the number of successful bribe attempts in the presence of middle-men is
given by (1− q)nc∗∗ + q (n− l) c∗∗ = (n− ql) c∗∗. Using this information
and comparing (5) and (8), we observe that,
Lemma 4 After a human resource reform, in the presence of middle-men,
a share c∗∗ > c∗ of the firms in each of the n industries aﬀected by the
reform oﬀer bribes. The total number of successful bribe attempts is given by
(n− ql) c∗∗ > (n− l) c∗.
For any given human resource reform, Lemma 4 shows that corruption
with middle-men is higher than without middle-men.
From (8) we can find that,
Lemma 5 For c∗∗ > 0, ∂c
∗∗
∂l = −
qpn(1−q)
t(n−lq)2 ≤ 0, with
∂c∗∗
∂l = 0 for q = 0,
∂c∗∗
∂p = −
lq(1−q)
t(n−lq) ≤ 0, with
∂c∗∗
∂p = 0 for q = 0,
∂c∗∗
∂q = −
³
1−
³
lq
n−lq
´
p
t
´
−³
pnl(1−q)
t(n−lq)2
´
< 0, where 1−
³
lq
n−lq
´
p
t
> 0 since c∗∗ > 0.
From Lemma 5 we observe that the policy implication is clear, and similar
to the case without middle-men: In the presence of middle-men, strengthen
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the institutional quality as much as possible and implement as radical human
resource and legal reforms as possible. These measures will all unambiguously
reduce corruption in society. The policy implication is, however, less clear if a
reform were to cause the entry of middle-men to the market. We now turn to
the relation between anti-corruption reform and the market for middle-men.
We will demonstrate that reforms may indeed pave the way for middle-men,
and that a possible eﬀect of the reform is to increase corruption relative
to the pre-reform level. Our analysis will specify under which conditions a
reform could lead to such a perverse outcome, and oﬀer advice on how to
carry out a successful anti-corruption reform.
3 How reformmay create a market for middle-
men
How does an anti-corruption reform aﬀect the incentive for middle-men to
enter the market? We model the supply of middle-men as simply as possible.
The fired tax oﬃcers, or other individuals with inside information about the
reformed bureaucracy, face the choice between establishing themselves as
tax experts or engaging in some productive activity at a given wage W > 0.
Hence, a middle-man establishes himself only if the industry level demand
for middle-man services M (l, p, q) > W . A reform in the tax administration
may increase the demand for middle-man services, such that M (l, p, q)−W
changes from being negative to positive, and thereby leads to the entry of
middle-men.
In order to establish this, we have to study more carefully the composition
of the demand for middle-man services among the various groups of firms.
We have already assumed that the middle-man is able to price discriminate
among the firms. Moreover, in the bargaining process between the middle-
man and the firm, we assume that the middle-man captures a share λ of each
firm’s willingness to pay. The share λ may reflect the competitive pressure
between middle-men (although we abstract from any explicit analysis of such
competition).
The willingness to pay for middle-man services depends on the value of
the alternative option for the firm, which determines the bargaining position
of the firm. Thus, it diﬀers between firms that alternatively pay taxes and
firms that alternatively pay bribes on their own. In this part of the analysis,
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it is useful to introduce some labels to the firms in the economy. A share c∗ of
the firms oﬀer bribes irrespective of whether a middle-man is in the market
or not. We shall refer to this group of firms as “bribe firms”. A share c∗∗−c∗
of the firms are potentially corrupt, in the sense that although they pay taxes
in the absence of a middle-man, they would make use of the corrupt services
of a middle-man if such were oﬀered. We shall refer to this group of firms as
“tax firms”. Finally, a share 1− c∗∗ of the firms pay the tax irrespective of
whether a middle-man is present or not. We shall refer to this group of firms
as “honest firms”.9 In sum, we have three types of firms in the economy, as
illustrated in Figure 1.
ci 10
Honest
firms
c**c*
Tax
firms
Bribe
firms
Figure 1: Composition of firms in the presence of middle-man
We can now write the industry level demand for middle-man services as:
M(l, p, q) =
λ
©
mb (l, p, q) c∗(l, p, q)
ª
+
λ {mt (l, p, q) [c∗∗(l, p, q)− c∗(l, p, q)]} , (9)
where mb and mt are the average willingness to pay for middle-man ser-
vices among bribe firms and tax firms, respectively. In (9) we have made
explicit the fact that both the average willingness to pay and the compo-
sition of firms depend on all the three dimensions of the anti-corruption
reform. In order to see how the total willingness to pay for middle-man ser-
vices depends on the extent of the reform, we study in more detail both how
a reform aﬀects the composition of firms and the average willingness to pay
for middle-man services in each of the two groups of firms in the economy.
9Note, however, that the only reason these firms are honest is that their bargaining
position is too low relative to the institutional quality to make it worth while oﬀering a
bribe.
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3.1 Composition of firms
Figure 2 illustrates how the composition of firms is aﬀected by a human
resource reform.10 For instance at l1, the share of bribe firms is given by cb1,
the share of tax firms by ct1, and the share of honest firms by
¡
1− ch1
¢
. Beyond
l∗, there are only honest firms and tax firms in the industry. Increasing
the human resource reform beyond l∗ reduces the number of tax firms and
increases the number of honest firms. At l2, the share of tax firms is given
by ct2, and the share of honest firms by
¡
1− ch2
¢
, with cb2 = 0.
l
ci
Honest firms
c**
c*
Tax firms
Bribe firms
l* nl1
 
c1
b
 
c1
t
 
c1
h
 
c2
t
 
c2
h
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Figure 2: Human resource reform and the composition of firms
Figure 2 illustrates the fact that as long as c∗ > 0, i.e., as long as there are
bribe firms in the economy, an increase in the number of honest tax collectors
increases the number of tax firms. It is also clear from Figure 2 that without
bribe firms in the economy, i.e., for c∗ = 0, which is true for l > l∗, the
number of tax firms falls in the number of honest tax collectors. Hence, the
10Figure 1 is based on p = t, n = 1, q = 0.25. Given these values, c0 = 0.75, l∗ = 0.5.
We have also chosen l0 = 0.
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number of tax firms increases in l until c∗ = 0, and then falls in l. The same
is true for a legal reform. Increasing the punishment for corruption increases
the number of tax firms, given that c∗ > 0. For c∗ = 0, increased punishment
reduces the number of tax firms. Hence, the number of tax firms rises in p
until c∗ = 0, and then falls in p. These observations can be demonstrated
more formally as follows:
Lemma 6 Comparing (5) and (8), we find that c∗∗ − c∗ = lpn(1−q)
2
t(n−lq)(n−l) . For
c∗ > 0, ∂(c
∗∗−c∗)
∂l =
pn(1−q)2(n2−l2q)
t(n−lq)2(n−l)2 > 0,
∂(c∗∗−c∗)
∂p =
nl(1−q)2
t(n−lq)(n−l) > 0,
∂(c∗∗−c∗)
∂q =
− lpn(1−q)[(n−lq)+(n−l)]
t(n−lq)2(n−l) < 0.
The eﬀect of reform on the number of tax firms for c∗ = 0 can be found
from Lemma 5.
Table 1 summarizes the eﬀect on the composition of firms of an anti-
corruption reform involving the three dimensions, human resource reform,
legal reform, and institutional reform. In the table, “−” indicates a reduction
in the share of this type of firm, “+” an increase in the share of this type of
firm. The sign “+/−” for tax firms under an increase in l and p reflects the
situation with c∗ > 0 and c∗ = 0, respectively. The table is based on q > 0.
Table 1. Composition of firms
l ↑ p ↑ q ↑
Bribe firms − − −
Tax firms +/− +/− −
Honest firms + + +
3.2 Average willingness to pay
We now turn to a discussion of the average willingness to pay for each group
of firms. For the bribe firms, the best alternative is to oﬀer a bribe directly
to the bureaucrat. The average bargaining position of a bribe firm is given
by c∗/2. For the tax firms, on the other hand, the best alternative is to pay
the tax. The average bargaining position for this group of firms is given by
c∗ + (c∗∗ − c∗) /2 = (c∗∗ + c∗) /2.
Define the profits of an average tax firm using the services of a middle-
man by πˆmt . For this firm, the value added from using the services of a
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middle-man is given by,
πˆmt − πt = t−
(n− ql)
n
t (c∗∗ + c∗)
2 (1− q) −
ql (t+ p)
n
. (10)
This expression is not necessarily positive. For instance, if q is suﬃciently
high, πˆmt < πt and the average tax firm strictly prefers to pay the tax rather
than make use of the services of a middle-man, and the willingness to pay
for these services would then be zero. The average willingness to pay for
middle-man services for this type of firm can be found as,
mt = max
¡
πˆmt − πt, 0
¢
. (11)
From (10) we can find that:
Lemma 7 (a) For c∗ > 0, ∂m
t
∂l =
(1−q)np
2(n−l)2 > 0,
∂mt
∂p =
(1−q)l
2(n−l) > 0,
∂mt
∂q =
− pl
2(n−l) < 0.
(b) For c∗ = 0, ∂m
t
∂l = −
q(t+p)
2n
≤ 0, with ∂mt∂l = 0 for q = 0,
∂mt
∂p = −
lq
2n
≤
0, with ∂m
t
∂p = 0 for q = 0,
∂mt
∂q = −
l(t+p)
2n
< 0.
It is interesting to note that the average tax firm’s willingness to pay for
middle-man services increases in l as long as there are bribe firms in the
economy. This is true even though the willingness to pay for middle-man
services for any given tax firm falls with a human resource reform or a legal
reform. The reason is that the human resource reform causes the weakest
bribe firms to convert into tax firms and the weakest tax firms to convert
into honest firms. This makes the average tax firm more influential and thus
more in demand of middle-man services. Hence, the average willingness to
pay, mt, increases with l. Note that when there are no bribe firms in the
economy, mt falls in l. In this case, the rise in average bargaining power
is dominated by the reduction in each firm’s willingness to pay. The same
is true for a legal reform increasing p, causing an increase in mt as long as
c∗∗ > 0, and then reducing mt for c∗∗ = 0.
Define the profits of an average bribe firm using the services of a middle-
man by πˆmb and the average bribe firm’s profits approaching the bureaucracy
directly by πˆb. The average willingness to pay for middle-man services for
bribe firms can then be found as
mb = πˆmb − πˆb =
l
n
(1− q)
·
t
µ
1− c
∗
2 (1− q)
¶
+ p
¸
, (12)
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where mb > 0 as long as c∗ > 0. From (12) we can find that:
Lemma 8 For c∗ > 0, ∂m
b
∂l =
(1−q)[t(n−l)2+p(n−l)2+pn2]
2n(n−l)2 > 0,
∂mb
∂p =
l(1−q)(2n−l)
2n(n−l) >
0, ∂m
b
∂q = −
l[t(n−l)+p(2n−l)]
2n(n−l) < 0.
If bribe firms exist, mb increases with l and p. Intuitively, bribe firms
are involved in corruption with or without middle-men. An increase in the
chances of being caught or an increase in punishment increases the value of
middle-man services for this group of firms.
Table 2 summarizes the eﬀect of a human resource, legal, and institutional
reform on the average willingness to pay for middle-man services of tax firms
and bribe firms. Again, the sign “+/−” reflects the situation with c∗ > 0
and c∗ = 0, respectively.
Table 2. Average willingness to pay
l ↑ p ↑ q ↑
Tax firms +/− +/− −
Bribe firms + + −
3.3 Total willingness to pay
As the disaggregated analysis of the demand for middle-man services should
make clear, the eﬀect of an anti-corruption reform on the total willingness
to pay for middle-man services is non-monotonic and complex. A human
resource reform negatively aﬀects the share of bribe firms in the economy
(∂c
∗
∂l < 0, see Lemma 3), but at the same time increases the average will-
ingness to pay for middle-man services by this group of firms (∂m
b
∂l > 0, see
Lemma 8). Hence, the total eﬀect of a human resource reform on bribe firms’
demand for middle-man services, i.e., ∂M
b
∂l , is undetermined. Similarly, the
eﬀect of a human resource reform on tax firms’ average willingness to pay
depends on whether c∗ is positive or zero (∂m
t
∂l > 0 for c
∗ > 0 and ∂m
t
∂l < 0
for c∗ = 0, see Lemma 7). The eﬀect of such a reform on the share of tax
firms also depends on whether c∗ is positive or zero (∂(c
∗∗−c∗)
∂l > 0 for c
∗ > 0,
and ∂(c
∗∗−c∗)
∂l < 0 for c
∗ = 0, see Lemma 6).
In sum, the exact relationship betweenM and the various anti-corruption
measures is intricate, since both mb and mt vary with l, p, and q, as do the
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critical levels of bargaining power c∗ and c∗∗. However, our main point can be
shown without a full characterization ofM(l, p, q). It is suﬃcient to establish
the following lemmas.
Lemma 9 The total willingness to pay for middle-man services is always
increasing in the size of the human resource reform if the initial level of
corruption in the bureaucracy is suﬃciently large.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 10 The total willingness to pay for middle-man services is always
increasing in the size of the punishment if the initial level of punishment in
the bureaucracy is suﬃciently low.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 11 The total willingness to pay for middle-man services is always
decreasing in the level of institutional quality.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given these lemmas, we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A human resource reform may establish a market for middle-
men. Similarly, an increase in punishment may contribute to establishing
a market for middle-men. An improvement in institutional quality never
contributes to a market for middle-men being established.
Proof. (i) Let us first prove that a human resource reform may lead to a
market for middle-men being established. From Lemma 9 and the fact that
M(0, p, q) = 0, it follows that there exists l+ > 0 such that M(l+, p, q) > 0
if q < 1 and p > 0. Suppose that M(l+, p, q) > W > 0 and l+ > l0. It
now follows that a market for middle-men will be established by a human
resource reform generating l+ honest tax oﬃcers.
(ii) We now prove that an increase in punishment may contribute to
establish a market for middle-men. From Lemma 10 and the fact that
M(l, 0, q) = 0, it follows that there exists p+ > 0 such that M(l, p+, q) > 0.
Suppose that M(l, p+, q) > W > M(l, 0, q) and p+ > 0. It now follows that
a market for middle-men is only established if a human resource reform gen-
erating l honest tax oﬃcers is combined with a legal reform increasing the
punishment from 0 to p+.
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(iii) Finally, let us show that an improvement in institutional quality
never contributes to a market for middle-men being established. By Lemma
11, we know that M(l, p, q+) < M(l, p, q) for any q+ > q. Hence, if a human
resource reform does not generate a market for middle-men, then neither will
a further improvement in institutional quality.
The establishment of a market for middle-man always reduces the eﬀect
of an anti-corruption reform (as discussed in Section 2.3). However, to eval-
uate whether the anti-corruption reform has been successful or not, we are
interested in comparing the level of corruption after the reform with the pre-
reform level. In the following, we demonstrate that corruption may in fact
be higher after the reform than before the reform.
4 How middle-men may undermine reform
A human resource reform followed by the entry of middle-men results in nc∗∗
bribe attempts, and (n− ql) c∗∗ successful bribe oﬀers. Hence, relative to the
pre-reform situation, the increase in completed corrupt transaction caused by
a human resource reform followed by the entry of middle-men is given by
(n− ql) c∗∗ −
¡
n− l0
¢
c0 =
µ
l0 −
lq (p+ t)
t
¶
(1− q) . (13)
We can easily show that,
(n− ql) c∗∗ >
¡
n− l0
¢
c0 ⇒ l0
l
> q
³
1− p
t
´
. (14)
We are now ready to establish the main proposition of the paper.
Proposition 2 A human resource reform may lead to more corruption than
in the pre-reform situation.
Proof. (i) From Proposition 1, it follows that there exist some l+ and
W such that a human resource reform generates a market for middle-men.
(ii) The result can be established by considering (14). For any p > 0,
the right-hand side of the inequality (14), q
¡
1− p
t
¢
< 1. It then follows
straightforwardly that there exists some cases where l0 is suﬃciently close to
l+ such that l0
l+
> q
¡
1− p
t
¢
.
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This observation clearly demonstrates that middle-men may undermine
anti-corruption reform. Without middle-men, the anti-corruption reform
would have reduced corruption in society. With middle-men, corruption may
in fact be higher than it was before the reform.
It also turns out that a small reformmay be preferable to a radical reform.
Proposition 3 A small human resource reform may reduce corruption, whereas
a more radical reform may increase corruption.
Proof. (i) From Proposition 2, it follows that there exists l0, l+ such
that corruption increases by a human resource reform generating l+ honest
tax oﬃcers.
(ii) By Lemma 9, it follows that there exists some l∗, where l+ > l∗ > l0
and M(l+, p, q) > M(l∗, p, q).
(iii) Suppose that M(l+, p, q) > W > M(l∗, p, q). In this case, it follows
that no market for middle-men will be established by a smaller human re-
source reform generating l∗ honest tax oﬃcers. Hence, by Lemma 2, it follows
that corruption will be reduced compared to the pre-reform situation.
Figure 3 illustrates the result from Proposition 3. The curve denoted
“Middle-men” shows the profitability of entry of middle-men, more specif-
ically M − W . We see that middle-men enter the market for l ∈ (l1, l3).
The pre-reform level of corruption is given by (n− l0) c0. A small human
resource reform, such that l ∈ (l0, l1) reduces corruption. At l1, however,
demand for middle-man services is such that middle-men find it profitable to
enter. This leads to a radical increase in corruption. Indeed, for l ∈ (l1, l2),
post-reform corruption exceeds the pre-reform level. For l ∈ (l2, l3), post-
reform corruption is lower than the pre-reform level. For l > l3, the demand
for middle-men is suﬃciently low not to make it profitable for middle-men
to enter. Beyond l > l3, if such a reform is practically feasible, no middle-
men establish themselves in the market, all firms choose to pay taxes, and
corruption is eliminated.
So far we have established that a human resource reform may increase
corruption and that a small reform may be preferable to a radical reform.
But how often should we expect this to be the case? Given that our analysis
is motivated by references to problems in countries with a low wage rate
and poor institutional quality, the following observation should be of much
importance.
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Figure 3: Corruption and the size of reform
Proposition 4 For a suﬃciently low level of institutional quality and wage
rate, every human resource reform increases corruption.
Proof. Assume p > 0 and q = 0.
(i) By (8), it follows that c∗∗ = 1 for any l, l0 < l < n. Hence, by (9),
(10) and (11), it follows that M(l, p, q) > 0 for any l0 < l < n.
(ii) Suppose that W < minlM(l, p, q) for l0 < l. It then follows from (i)
that any human resource reform generates a market for middle-men. In this
case, it follows straightforwardly from (13) that corruption increases, since
for any l, l0
l
> q(1− p
t
) = 0.
(iii) More generally, there is always some q > 0 that makes this statement
true.
Figure 4 illustrates the observation made in Proposition 4. When W is
suﬃciently low, a middle-man enters the market for any l > l0. In the figure,
this is illustrated by the fact that the curve denoted ”Middle-men” is always
positive for l > l0, indicating that M > W . If q = 0, the level of corruption
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in the economy is given by n, see Lemma 4. The willingness to pay for
middle-men increases until there are no bribe firms left in the economy. The
reason is that an increase in l makes it less attractive for firms to bribe on
their own. More firms will then have paying the tax as their best alternative,
and this increases the demand for middle-man services. When l is suﬃciently
high, there are no bribe firms left in the economy. Beyond this point, the
demand for middle-man services is simply a trade-oﬀ between two certain
options, namely to pay the tax or to bribe via the middle-man, which with
q = 0 involves no risk. An increase in l beyond this point does not aﬀect this
trade-oﬀ, and hence does not aﬀect the willingness to pay for middle-man
services.
l
n
Middle-men
Corruption
l0
(n-l0)c0
nc**
Figure 4: Reform with low-quality institutions
At the same time, it is important to notice that a suﬃciently radical
reform will be successful in an environment of high institutional quality.
Proposition 5 For a suﬃciently high level of institutional quality, a radical
reform reduces corruption.
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Proof. From (8), it follows that c∗∗ = 0 if 1
q
t
t+p
≤ l
n
. It follows that for
a suﬃciently high level of q, the left hand side of this expression is strictly
less than 1. Hence, for a suﬃciently radical reform, the inequality will be
satisfied. If c∗∗ = 0, then it follows that M(l, p, q) = 0. Hence, there will
be no market for middle-men. From Lemma 2, we know that in this case, a
reform reduces corruption.
Let us consider how a legal reform and an improvement in institutional
quality will aﬀect the consequences of a human resource reform.
Proposition 6 An increase in punishment may contribute to a further in-
crease in corruption.
Proof. (i) It follows from Proposition 1 that there exist l, W, p+ > 0 such
that a market for middle-men only will be established by a human resource
reform generating l honest tax oﬃcers if it is combined with a legal reform
increasing the punishment from 0 to p+.
(ii) By Lemma 2, it follows that corruption decreases unless there is an
increase in punishment. It follows straightforwardly from (14) that there
exists some cases where l0 is suﬃciently close to l such that l0l > q
¡
1− 0
t
¢
= q.
In a number of the reported results, we have illustrated how a human
resource reform may undermine an anti-corruption reform in an environment
of low institutional quality. Let us close this section by reporting a result
that shows that there are no cases where we have a paradoxical relationship
between an improvement in institutional quality and the level of corruption.
Proposition 7 An improvement in institutional quality always reduces cor-
ruption.
Proof. By Proposition 1, we know that if a human resource reform
does not generate a market for middle-men, then neither will a further im-
provement in institutional quality. Hence, from Lemma 2 it follows that an
improvement in institutional quality will reduce corruption. Moreover, if a
human resource reform actually generates a market for middle-men, then
an improvement in the institutional quality may eliminate this market and,
from Lemma 3 and 4, reduce corruption. In any case, by Lemma 5 it follows
that an improvement in institutional quality reduces corruption even if the
middle-men remain in the market.
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5 Concluding remarks
The reform in the Tanzanian tax administration in the mid-1990s appears
to have been a short-lived success. In the wake of the reform, a number
of “tax experts” established themselves in the market, many of them being
laid oﬀ tax bureaucrats. There are indications that these experts provided
services to firms that allowed corruption to rise. Our analysis provides a
formal analysis of how middle-men can undermine anti-corruption reform.
They do so by reducing the uncertainty that firms face in corrupt dealings
with the reformed tax bureaucracy.
While focusing on an increase in the number of honest tax bureaucrats,
we have also investigated other dimensions of the anti-corruption campaign,
notably increased punishment for corruption and improved institutional qual-
ity. Our main conclusions are that in an imperfect institutional environment,
firing more corrupt tax oﬃcers and increasing the punishment for corrupt
crimes may be counterproductive. These measures may increase the demand
for middle-man services and thereby create a market for middle-men, which
allows “corruption as usual” to continue through new channels.
Our study has been inspired by the anti-corruption reform in Tanzania,
but we believe that there are important general lessons to be learned from
our analysis. First, we demonstrate how reform in an environment of weak
institutions may go wrong. Second, we highlight the need for a broad ap-
proach to anti-corruption work. For example, neither an institutional reform
nor an increase in the share of honest tax oﬃcers will improve the situation
if corruption is not punished. Similarly, if institutions are suﬃciently poor,
increasing the share of honest tax oﬃcers or increasing punishment will have
little eﬀect if middle-men play an important role in mediating corruption.
Our main policy advice is therefore that the government should be careful
with implementing anti-corruption reforms in an environment of weak insti-
tutions. The probability that the anti-corruption campaign will be successful
increases if the government implements institutional reforms, strengthening
transparency and accounting systems in the organization, prior to imple-
menting a human resource reform.
We have focussed on the eﬀect of anti-corruption reform on the demand
for middle-man services. The supply of such services was modelled in a very
simple way, as a choice for the fired tax bureaucrat between a given wage in
some productive activity and the monopolistic rents that he would earn as a
middle-man. A more careful analysis of the supply side would involve dealing
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with issues such as the degree of competition between tax experts and the
possibility of middle-men being punished for their involvement in corrupt
transactions. We leave these interesting extensions to future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. Given q < 1 and p > 0 and (9), consider the case where l = 0:
∂M(0, p, q)
∂l =
λ[∂m
b(0,p,q)
∂l c
∗(0, p, q) +mb (0, p, q) ∂c
∗(0,p,q)
∂l +
∂mt(0,p,q)
∂l [c
∗∗(0, p, q)− c∗(0, p, q)]+
mt (0, p, q) ∂(c
∗∗(0,p,q)−c∗(0,p,q))
∂l ].
(15)
Evaluating the four terms inside the brackets for q < 1, it follows from
Lemma 8 and (5) that the first term is positive (because ∂m
b(0,p,q)
∂l > 0 and
c∗(0, p, q) = 1 − q, respectively), from (12) that the second term is zero
(becausemb (0, p, q) = 0), from Lemma 6 that the third term is zero (because
c∗∗(0, p, q) − c∗(0, p, q) = 0), and from (10) that the fourth term is zero
(because mt (0, p, q) = 0).
6.2 Proof of Lemma 10
Proof. Given q < 1 and (9), consider the case where p = 0:
∂M(l, 0, q)
∂p =
λ[∂m
b(l,0,q)
∂p c
∗(l, 0, q) +mb (l, 0, q) ∂c
∗(l,0,q)
∂p +
∂mt(l,0,q)
∂p [c
∗∗(l, 0, q)− c∗(l, 0, q)]+
mt (l, 0, q) ∂(c
∗∗(l,0,q)−c∗(l,0,q))
∂p ].
(16)
Evaluating the four terms inside the brackets for q < 1, it follows from
Lemma 8 and (5) that the first term is positive (because ∂m
b(l,0,q)
∂p > 0 and
c∗(l, 0, q) = 1−q respectively), from (12) and Lemma 3 that the second term
is negative (because mb(l, 0, q) > 0 and ∂c
∗(l,0,q)
∂p < 0), from Lemma 6 that
the third term is zero (because c∗∗(l, 0, q) − c∗(l, 0, 1) = 0), and from (10)
that the fourth term is zero (because mt(l, 0, q) = 0). It is straightforward
to establish that the first term is greater than the second term.
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6.3 Proof of Lemma 11
Proof. Given q < 1 and (9),
∂M(l, p, q)
∂q =
λ[∂m
b(l,p,q)
∂q c
∗(l, p, q) +mb (l, p, q) ∂c
∗(l,p,q)
∂q +
∂mt(l,p,q)
∂q [c
∗∗(l, p, q)− c∗(l, p, q)] +
mt (l, p, q) ∂(c
∗∗(l,p,q)−c∗(l,p,q))
∂q ].
(17)
Evaluating the four terms inside the brackets for q < 1, it follows from
Lemma 8 and (5) that the first term is negative (because ∂m
b(l,p,q)
∂q < 0
and c∗(l, p, q) ≥ 0, respectively), from (12) and Lemma 3 that the second
term is negative (because mb (l, p, q) ≥ 0 and ∂c∗(l,p,q)∂q < 0), from Lemma
6 and Lemma 7 that the third term is negative (because ∂m
t(l,p,q)
∂q < 0 and
c∗∗(l, p, q)− c∗(l, p, q) > 0), and from (10) and Lemma 6 that the fourth term
is negative (because mt (l, p, q) ≥ 0 and ∂(c
∗∗(l,p,q)−c∗(l,p,q))
∂q < 0).
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Summary 
 
The anti-corruption reform in the Tanzanian tax 
bureaucracy in the mid-1990s was apparently a 
short-lived success. In the wake of the reform, a 
number of “tax experts” established themselves in 
the market, many of them being laid off tax 
bureaucrats. We argue that middle -men can 
undermine the effect of an anti-corruption reform by 
reducing the uncertainty that firms face vis -à-vis  a 
reformed tax bureaucracy, which in turn may 
encourage firms to pay bribes rather than taxes. 
Indeed, under some circumstances, middle-men can 
cause corruption to be higher after the reform than 
before the reform. Since the demand for middle -men 
may increase with the extent of the reform, we also 
demonstrate that a small reform may be more 
efficient in combatting corruption than a more 
radical reform. 
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